True Friendship and Happiness in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics
In the first book of his Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle calls his investigation one “of social and political matters,”[1] whose “end [telos]… is the good for man.” The work’s focus, then, is on the good for man, which is inseparably tied to politics, which in turn envelops each and every kind of relationship.[2] Friendship, as one of those relationships, is thus tied to “the good for man”—Aristotle goes so far as to call it “some sort of excellence or virtue [that] is… most indispensable for life.” Not only is friendship essential, but it is itself a virtue, and an indispensable one at that. The telos of politics, Aristotle says, is “the good for man,” and “the main concern of politics is to engender a certain character in the citizens and to make them good and disposed to perform noble actions” (NE, I.9:1099b30-32). Friendship, he claims, is necessary for man to perform good actions and so to be good and thus live a supremely happy life.
In Books VIII and IX of his work, Aristotle expounds upon friendship’s role in making men good in a specifically active sense. He explains that friendship, which is a virtue (activity in accord with right reason) and an external good, is not just helpful but essential to the good and happy life.[3] This paper will explore Aristotle’s writings on friendship in Nicomachean Ethics by defining the scope of philia (“friendship”), explaining the human desire for friendship, and detailing the three types of friendship. Then will follow a discussion of true friendship (Books VIII and IX) and how it brings about the good (happy) life that Aristotle describes in Book I. Perfect friendship, Aristotle argues, is intrinsically tied to the good and is necessary for supreme happiness. Through continuous virtuous activity, two good men, in each other’s company, can bring each other to permanent happiness.
The scope of philia, Aristotle’s Greek word for “friendship,” is similar to that of politike (“politics”): both Greek words have a wider semantic range than the narrow connotations that we modern readers attribute to their translated English counterparts. For Aristotle, “Philia… designates the relationship between a person and any other person(s) or being which that person regards as peculiarly his own and to which he has a peculiar attachment… [it] constitutes the bond which holds the members of any association together” (NE, VIII.1:1155a, note, p 214). As politics also deals with society, friendship also deals with states: it “seems to hold states together, and lawgivers apparently devote more attention to it than justice” (NE, VIII.1:1155a20-25). In keeping his terminology broad, Aristotle allows for an easy transition between these two concepts and his definition of the happy and good life. In his conversations about friendship, he focuses on the relationship between two persons; this experiential approach—for nearly every reader has had a friend—grounds his claims and brings a sense of familiarity to his “rough and general sketch” (NE, I.3:1094b20).
Aristotle appeals to what he considers the common experience in Book IX, asserting that
No one would choose to have all good things all by himself, for man is a social and political being and his natural condition is to live with others. Consequently… it is obviously better for him to spend his days with friends and good men than with any stranger who comes along. It follows that a happy man needs friends. (NE, IX.9:1169b15-22)
Interacting with others is man’s “natural condition,” so the desire for friendship naturally occurs within man, who desires above all else to be happy. While in Book I Aristotle describes “the final and perfect good” as “self-sufficient,” he clarifies that this does “not mean a man who lives his life in isolation, but a man who lives with parents, children, a wife, and friends and fellow citizens generally, since man is by nature a social and political being” (NE, I.7:1097b5-12). The philosopher takes care to emphasize the need for other people, the need for f